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*1 STATEMENT
This case concerns whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) requires that an arbitration clause, governed by
state law and interpreted by the state's highest court to allow class arbitration, be reinterpreted under a new federal standard of FAA contract interpretation to foreclose class arbitration. Green Tree wrote a sweeping arbitration clause in its standard-form adhesion contract and imposed it on respondents when they obtained mortgage-secured financing from Green Tree for home improvements or manufactured housing *2 in South Carolina. That
agreement stated that it would be “governed by the law of the State of South Carolina,” R. App. 2162, which
permits class arbitration in the absence of contract language specifically forbidding it. Employing standard rules
of contract interpretation applicable to all other contracts, the state high court held that Green Tree's clause
“does not limit the arbitration to non-class arbitration,” Pet. App. 19a, and that South Carolina law permits classwide arbitration, id. at 21a-22a. Under these circumstances, it is consistent with the FAA for respondents to pursue their wholly state-law claims in an arbitration class action.
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Years before respondents filed these cases, Green Tree had been held liable to other individuals for the same violations at issue here. Rather than correct its unlawful conduct, Green Tree continued to impose its illegal credit
procedure on thousands of additional borrowers. The arbitrator found that Green Tree had engaged in “wilful,
wanton and egregious” disregard of state law. Pet. App. 108a. After persisting for years in wholesale violation of
the South Carolina Consumer Code (“Consumer Code”), undeterred by successive individual cases, Green Tree
opposes class treatment in this case.
When respondents sought redress for Green Tree's predatory lending practices, they were bound by contract to
arbitrate before an arbitrator chosen by Green Tree. Respondents filed their two complaints as class actions, and
the arbitrator decided to proceed on a class-wide basis in both cases. Green Tree objected to class arbitration,
however, asserting that it was foreclosed by the arbitration clause. Every legal decision maker to have considered the question-including the arbitrator himself and the state courts up to and including the South Carolina
Supreme Court-has uniformly concluded that the agreement permitted class arbitration, and that respondents'
claims were appropriately arbitrated on a class-wide basis. Green Tree now seeks to convert the state-law question of the scope of the arbitration clause into a federal question under *3 the FAA. That position is untenable.
Green Tree advocates a dramatic expansion of the reach of the FAA into routine matters of state law that was
never intended by Congress and cannot be squared with this Court's cases.
1. The Arbitration Agreement. Petitioner Green Tree drafted the arbitration agreement at issue in this case and
included it in a standard form consumer Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement (“Agreement”).
Green Tree presented the Agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to each member of the respondent class when
the prospective borrower sought to purchase manufactured housing or home improvements financed by Green
Tree. The underlying claim common to all the class members is thus governed by the same arbitration clause in
the same standard-form contract of adhesion.
Green Tree's Agreement barred the use of juries, but otherwise said nothing about procedures for arbitration. Instead, it generally provided that “this contract will be governed by the law of the State of South Carolina.” R.
App. 2162. South Carolina law permits class arbitration, and neither the arbitration provision nor any other document Green Tree used in the transactions at issue made any reference to waiver of class actions. The arbitration
clause stated only that the parties waived their right to a jury trial, both in arbitration and in court. Pet. App.
[FN1]
110a.
Not until November 1998, well after the parties had completed the transactions at issue in this case,
did Green Tree amend its arbitration clause to require signatories to waive their right to “to participate as a representative*4 or a member of any class of claimants pertaining to any claim arising from or relating to this
[FN2]
agreement.”
FN1. Green Tree's arbitration clause preserved Green Tree's own right to elect to go to court when it
sought enforcement of any “mortgage, deed or trust, or other security agreement,” yet provided that any
such suit would not impair Green Tree's right to compel purchasers to arbitrate their claims, including
any counterclaims to claims Green Tree filed in court. Pet. App. 111a.
FN2. See Resp. Reply Brief to Amici Curiae, filed in No. 00-CP-18-443 (Supreme Court of South Carolina), at 6 & Attachment A. The validity of those agreements is not at issue in this case.
Green Tree's Agreement provided for mandatory, binding arbitration of “[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies
arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract, or the validity of this
arbitration clause or the entire contract.” The Agreement specifically granted the arbitrator authority over “all
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disputes arising under case law, statutory law, and all other laws, including, but not limited to, all contract, tort,
and property disputes.” The Agreement did not set forth arbitration procedures, but instead conferred on the arbitrator “all powers provided by the law and the contract.” Those powers, the agreement stated, “shall include all
legal and equitable remedies, including, but not limited to, monetary damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive
relief.” Pet. App. 110a.
2. The Underlying Claims. The respondent classes assert only state-law, non-diversity claims arising under the
Consumer Code. The Bazzle and Lackey cases, consolidated in the final opinion issued by the South Carolina
Supreme Court, began as two class actions arbitrated separately before the same arbitrator. Purchasers of mobile
homes comprise the Lackey class, and purchasers of home improvements comprise the Bazzle class. Both cases
involve real-estate secured transactions, all of which Green Tree structured in the same way, using the same
agreement, and all of which were affected by the identical violation of state consumer law. As the arbitrator ultimately found, Green Tree violated the class members' rights by systematically ignoring a clear statutory requirement that creditors in real-estate secured transactions *5 alert consumers of the need to retain their own lawyers
and insurance agents to represent their interests.
a. The South Carolina Attorney Preference law. In 1982, the South Carolina General Assembly (“General Assembly”) amended the Consumer Code to relieve creditors of usury restrictions, but sought to protect consumers
against predatory lending practices by reinforceing consumers' right to legal representation and insurance advice
in real-estate secured transactions. The 1982 Consumer Code amendments eliminated caps on the interest rates
that creditors could charge for consumer credit, and authorized creditors to charge certain fees. 1982 S.C. Act
385 § 56. To safeguard consumers, the General Assembly also included a requirement that creditors advise each
consumer of his or her right to retain an attorney and insurance agent to provide professional services at the
[FN3]
closing of real estate transactions. S.C. Code Ann. § 37-10-102 (the “Preference Statute”).
Under the Preference Statute, the creditor was required to record on the first page of each credit application the consumer's
chosen representatives. Id. The Preference Statute applies to all consumer loans secured by real estate without
regard to whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration clause. The General Assembly enacted the
Preference Statute to prevent creditors from locking consumers into usurious interest rates or other unfair contract terms and securing those loans with *6 the consumer's real estate without the consumer having the benefit
of an attorney and insurance agent to give advice. In the absence of professional guidance, consumers often fail
to appreciate the terms and the total dollar cost of a “deal,” and may remain unaware that a loan will be secured
by liens on their real property that can hinder property sale or lead to forfeiture if payment is not timely made.
R. App. 1720, 1722.
FN3. Section 37-10-102(a) provides, in pertinent part: Whenever the primary purpose of a loan that is
secured in whole or in part by a lien on real estate is for a personal, family or household purpose-(a)
The creditor must ascertain the preference of the borrower as to the legal counsel that is employed to
represent the debtor in all matters of the transaction relating to the closing of the transaction and … the
insurance agent to furnish required hazard and flood property insurance in connection with the mortgage and comply with such preference, and the credit application on the first page thereof must contain
information as is necessary to ascertain these preferences of the borrower.
In May 1997, after both the Bazzle and Lackey complaints had been filed, the General Assembly amended the
Preference Statute. The Preference Statute previously placed no special limits on the right of consumers to proceed against violators on a class-wide basis. See Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 508 S.E.2d 16, 21 (S.C. 1998). The
statute's pre-1977 penalty provision also provided that violators could be required to forfeit the total amount of
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the loan finance charge, repay to the consumer double the amount of interest collected, pay costs of the action,
and allow the consumer to repay the balance of the loan without any loan finance charges. See Tilley, 508 S.E.2d
at 36 n.2. The 1997 Preference Statute amendments foreclosed future class actions for violations of the Preference Statute and established a fixed penalty range of $1,500-$7,500. The same amendment, however, expressly
directed that all Preference Statute cases “filed as class actions, without regard to certification, prior to May 2,
1997, may proceed.” 1997 S.C. Act 99 § 5. Bazzle and Lackey were both filed before that date, and the General
Assembly was aware of the pendency of these and other Preference Statute class actions when it amended the
Consumer Code. See R. App. 75a.
b. The Transactions. As noted above, the two cases at issue here involve two types of transactions secured by
South Carolina real estate: mobile-home purchase transactions (Lackey) and home-improvement transactions
(Bazzle).
*7 In a typical mobile-home transaction (litigated in Lackey), the purchaser entered into a preprinted consumer
installment contract and security agreement with Green Tree to buy a mobile home. Green Tree's dealer had the
purchaser fill out a Green Tree credit application. The credit application did not include the required Preference
Statute disclosure. If Green Tree elected to extend credit, it set the terms of the credit, prepared all the necessary
documents for closing, and transmitted the documents to its dealer. The documents included a mortgage prepared by Green Tree. The mortgage, on its face, directed the local recording office to return it directly to Green
Tree. No attorney was involved in those transactions, nor were consumers advised of the need to consult counsel. Pet. App. 87a-88a.
The Bazzle transaction is typical of a home-improvement transaction. A home-improvement contractor offering
financing through Green Tree solicited customers door-to-door, offering home-improvement services. The contractor, acting as a dealer for Green Tree, advised the customer that home improvements could be financed. The
customer completed a credit application that was then submitted to Green Tree. The dealer did not disclose the
terms of the credit or the encumbrance placed on the purchaser's existing real estate. If the customer agreed to
purchase home improvements, the Green Tree dealer returned to the customer's home with the transaction documents. Pet. App. 61a-62a.
All of the transaction documents were standard preprinted form contracts of adhesion prepared by Green Tree.
Green Tree set all of the terms of financing, including the rate of interest. The documents, if explained at all,
were not prepared or reviewed by any attorney or agent for the purchasers. Green Tree never gave the purchasers
the required Preference Statute disclosures. Pet. App. 61a-62a. Many purchasers did not understand that they
were securing the credit transaction with a mortgage on their home, and would only discover *8 Green Tree's
mortgage when they attempted to sell or refinance their home. R. App. 1720, 1722.
3. The Proceedings Below
a. Lackey v. Green Tree. Daniel Lackey filed his class-action complaint in state court on May 28, 1996. He alleged that Green Tree systematically violated the Preference Statute in manufactured-housing and homeimprovement transactions secured by South Carolina real estate. Green Tree answered, and the Lackey plaintiffs
moved for class certification. R. App. 123-124. Green Tree then moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration, and the trial court denied the motion because it found the arbitration clause unconscionable. Pet. App. 6a.
Green Tree appealed, and on March 3, 1998, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Pet.
App. 6a. The court of appeals held that the contract was not unconscionable, but agreed with the trial court that
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it was a contract of adhesion. R. App. 3. The trial court on remand entered a consent order on July 23, 1998,
submitting the case for arbitration before the Honorable Thomas J. Ervin, a retired state circuit court judge
chosen by Green Tree. R. App. 75.
On August 19, 1998, the arbitrator held a hearing to consider whether Green Tree's arbitration agreement prevented class arbitration. Following briefing and a hearing, the arbitrator determined that the Agreement did not
preclude class arbitration and scheduled a class certification hearing. R. App. 73.
On November 23, 1998, the arbitrator held a hearing on class certification and certified the class. R. App. 71-72.
Contrary to petitioner's contentions (Pet. Br. 12), the arbitrator did not “follow the approach that had been im[FN4]
posed *9 on him by the trial court in Bazzle.”
Rather, he independently “determined that a class action
should proceed in arbitration” based on his “careful review of the broadly drafted arbitration clause prepared by
Green Tree.” Pet. App. 84a. The arbitrator “found that the requirements for class certification were met and that
class certification was appropriate.” Id. at 86a. The arbitrator approved a notice of class arbitration to inform unnamed class members of their choice to opt out, and class counsel mailed it to each class member. J.A. 17-23.
Ten persons opted out of the Lackey class. Pet. App. 91a. The arbitrator also excluded from the class 36 persons
whose transactions were closed outside of South Carolina, and 73 persons whose contracts with Green Tree did
[FN5]
not include the arbitration clause. Pet. App. 90a-91a.
FN4. The Bazzle case was filed and class certification order entered while Green Tree's appeal of the
unconscionability decision in Lackey was pending. At the time of the Lackey class certification hearing,
the Bazzle case had not yet been assigned to the arbitrator and the Bazzle class certification order was
under challenge in a petition Green Tree filed in the South Carolina Supreme Court.
FN5. The purchasers excluded from the arbitration classes because they were not bound by arbitration
clauses brought a class action in court. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Flemmings, C/A No: 96-CP-40-4282,
Richland County Court of Common Pleas. The parties in Flemmings stipulated to the record developed
in the Bazzle and Lackey arbitrations. The court granted summary judgment on liability and awarded
damages of $7500 per transaction. The court further found that Green Tree's conduct was unconscionable, requiring that Green Tree forfeit all remaining interest. Green Tree did not appeal.
The Lackey class was initially defined broadly to include both manufactured-housing and home-improvement
real-estate-secured transactions. Once both the Bazzle and Lackey cases were in arbitration, however, Green
Tree requested that the home-improvement borrowers in the Lackey class be bifurcated from the Lackey arbitration and consolidated into the Bazzle class. The arbitrator granted that request, R. App. *10 58-59, and the cases
thereafter were delineated by type of transaction. The arbitrator maintained the separation between Bazzle and
Lackey because Green Tree operated distinct home-improvement and manufactured-housing divisions, and the
facts regarding each division's efforts, if any, to comply with the Preference Statute potentially raised distinct
factual questions as to each class.
The arbitrator held a trial on the merits on March 6-8, 2000, R. App. 643-994 (trial transcript), and held Green
Tree liable, finding that “Green Tree's behavior in this matter was wilful, wanton and egregious,” Pet. App.
108a. In his final order and award, the arbitrator stated that Green Tree “failed to provide any evidence or testimony of compliance” with the Preference Statute, and failed to dispute that “a large number” of its contracts
during the relevant time period were completed in violation of that law. Id. at 67a & n.4. The arbitrator awarded
$5,000 per transaction to each of the Lackey class members.
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After the arbitrator issued his final order, Green Tree moved the state court to vacate and remand that order
based in part on assertions that the Agreement barred class arbitration. The court denied the motion, and granted
plaintiffs' motion to confirm the award. Pet. App. 36a-54a. The court observed that:
the contract itself states that all disputes, claims or controversies relating to the contract or the validity of the arbitration clause or the entire contract shall be resolved by binding arbitration by the arbitrator. Here, Green Tree
drafted its own arbitration clause making clear that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability and the decision
by the Arbitrator to arbitrate this matter as a class is binding on Green Tree.
Pet. App. 51a. The court rejected Green Tree's argument that the clause's reference to “this contract” foreclosed
class-wide *11 arbitration: “Th[e] ‘all powers' language provided by the clause is in addition to the contract
rights and remedies and includes the right to determine class arbitration.” Pet. App. 49a.
Green Tree appealed, and the state supreme court accepted jurisdiction, consolidating the appeal with a parallel
appeal in Bazzle. Pet. App. 2a.
b. Bazzle v. Green Tree. In March 1997, Lynn and Burt Bazzle filed suit against Green Tree for violating the
Preference Statute in home-improvement transactions secured by real estate. Pet. App. 56a. The plaintiffs moved
for class certification and Green Tree moved to compel arbitration. In late 1997, following local practice of ruling on motions in the order in which they are filed, the South Carolina trial court heard argument on and granted
the Bazzles' motion for class certification, R. App. 1350-1358, and then heard argument on and granted Green
Tree's motion to compel arbitration, R. App. 1359-1363. The judge also ordered that all foreclosure proceedings
against plaintiff class members be stayed pending arbitration. R. App. 1363. Green Tree made no argument that
the trial court lacked power to certify a class pending arbitration. R. App. 1448-1449.
In support of class certification, the court concluded that “clearly all the prerequisites of [South Carolina] Rule
[of Civil Procedure] 23 have been met.” Numerosity was readily met because “Green Tree admits that neither it
nor its dealers have advised consumers that they had a right to select a closing attorney or insurance agent,” and
Green Tree engaged in “at least 3,600 similar type transactions.” The legal and factual questions at stake were
common, “apply[ing] to all class members,” and the named plaintiffs' claims were typical of those of the class
because “the named plaintiffs, as well as all the members of the putative class, have identical claims against the
defendants.” The adequacy of representation by *12 the named plaintiffs, who had “no potential for conflicting
interest” with class members, and by their counsel, who had “experience and past success in matters strikingly
similar to the instant case,” was also clear and not disputed. Finally, the court found that the South Carolina Rule
23 $100 amount-in-controversy requirement was met. The court ordered plaintiffs to “provide actual notice to
the class members in accordance with Rule 23 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,” and to provide
class members the opportunity to opt out of the class. R. App. 1352-1357, 1348. Twelve members elected to opt
out of the Bazzle class. Pet. App. 68a.
In January 1998, Green Tree urged the trial court to reconsider its order certifying the class, arguing that ‘class
arbitration of the plaintiff's claims is not authorized under the existing agreement of the parties and the law interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act.” R. App. 1451. The court denied the motion, noting that the cases that Green
Tree cited “imply that class arbitration is possible given the right set of circumstances.” The court also found
that Green Tree's arbitration clause “is so broad that one can easily infer that both parties intended to include
[FN6]
class arbitration.” R. App. 1347.
FN6. Both the South Carolina Court of Appeals and Supreme Court denied Green Tree's attempts to ob-
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tain interlocutory appellate review. Pet. App. 57a-58a; see R. App. 1306.
On May, 12, 1999, Green Tree moved the trial court to dismiss or in the alternative to decertify the class in
whole or in part, R. App. 1455, but the court denied the motion for want of jurisdiction over a matter pending in
arbitration, Pet. App. 29a. Two and a half years after the court granted Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration, the Bazzle case was sent to arbitration. Although Judge Ervin had by then certified a class in Lackey, Green
Tree chose him to arbitrate Bazzle as well.
*13 Green Tree then moved the arbitrator to dismiss the action or, in the alternative, to decertify the class, placing the Bazzle class certification issue squarely before the arbitrator. Pet. App. 29; R. App. 1455, 3533-3543.
On March 23, 2000, the arbitrator denied Green Tree's motion to dismiss and request for decertification, but
granted its request that the class claims be narrowed to include only the Preference-Statute and unconscionability claims. R. App. 1400-1404. As his action makes clear, the arbitrator plainly understood that he had independent authority to decide whether and how to proceed with class arbitration, notwithstanding the trial court's order
granting certification before sending the matter to arbitration.
After conducting a hearing on May 31, 2000, R. App. 1819-2023 (trial transcript) the arbitrator issued his written award. Pet App. 55a-81a. The arbitrator held Green Tree liable for violating the Preference Statute and awarded relief on a class-wide basis. He found that Green Tree submitted no evidence of compliance or attempted
compliance with the Preference Statute enacted years earlier. “Despite Green Tree's vast financial resources, it
took no affirmative action to educate itself on the requirements of the South Carolina attorney preference statute.” Id. at 69a. The arbitrator concluded that the evidence clearly showed an ongoing pattern and practice that
began as a careless or negligent attitude and graduated into a willful non-compliance and disregard for South
Carolina law:
Green Tree offered no evidence of any nature that after it was sued by [other consumers] in 1994 that it attempted to comply with the preference statute ….
… After five suits, including [the Bazzle suit], having been brought against Green Tree for failing to comply
with the preference statute, it still continued to refuse to take any action or to adhere to the statute's requirements.… Thus, based on the testimony and the evidence of record, I find that Green Tree simply chose *14 to
totally ignore the law despite learning of the requirement. As a result of its behavior, Green Tree's conduct rises
to a shocking level of callous and reckless indifference to the rights of South Carolina residents.
Id. at 67a-68a, 69a.
Based on these determinations, the arbitrator awarded a $5,000 penalty to aggrieved consumers in 1,323 homeimprovement transactions that occurred prior to the time Green Tree had actual notice of its non-compliance.
For the remaining 576 home-improvement transactions that occurred after Green Tree had actual notice of the
unlawfulness of its own practices and still did nothing to comply, the arbitrator awarded $7,500 per transaction,
[FN7]
Pet. App. 71a, 80a. The arbitrator also awarded reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. Id. at 80a-81a.
FN7. Petitioner's suggestion (Pet. Br. 13) that class counsel's fee award was excessive is baseless and,
since it is a state law question, wholly gratuitous. See Pet. App. 71a-79a (Arbitrator's detailed justification for award). Green Tree's own clear and wilful law violations and ensuing litigiousness necessitated
substantial work by class counsel, despite the fact that Green Tree lacked any colorable defense on the
merits.
In accordance with applicable state law, the Bazzles filed a motion to confirm the award in South Carolina trial
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court, R. App. 1457, and Green Tree filed a motion to remand the award for amendment and clarification, R.
App.1538. On September 15, 2000, the state trial court denied Green Tree's motion and confirmed the award of
the arbitrator, determining that the arbitrator acted within his authority to hold Green Tree liable on a class-wide
basis. Pet. App. 27a-35a. Green Tree appealed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to
hear the appeal in consolidation with the Lackey case. Pet. App. 2a.
*15 c. The South Carolina Supreme Court decision. The state high court unanimously affirmed. Stressing that
South Carolina law “favors arbitration of disputes,” and that the state courts accordingly “resolve any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues in favor of arbitration,” Pet. App. 17a, the court applied state contract
law to hold that Green Tree's contract language “does not limit the arbitration to non-class arbitration.” Pet.
App. 19a.
The court emphasized that its decision rested on “independent state grounds”: “[U]nder general principles of
contract interpretation, we construe Green Tree's omission of any reference to class actions against them.” Id. at
20a-21a. The Court found the contract language ambiguous “[a]t best,” Pet. App. 19a, noting that the requirement that ambiguous language be construed against the drafter not only was well settled in South Carolina, Pet.
App. 17a (citing Myrtle Beach Lumber Co., Inc. v. Willoughby, 274 S.E.2d 423 (S.C.1981)), but also comports
with this Court's FAA jurisprudence, Pet. App. 18a (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514
U.S. 53 (1995)). The court specifically rejected Green Tree's argument that the arbitration clause's reference to
disputes relating to “this contract” precludes class arbitration. Pet. App. 19a.
The court also emphasized that “no case law or statute in South Carolina prohibits class-wide arbitration. To the
contrary, this Court strongly favors arbitration and has held that a state court may order consolidation of claims
subject to mandatory arbitration without any contractual or statutory directive to do so.” Pet. App. 21a (citing
Episcopal Housing Corp. v. Federal. Ins. Co., 255 S.E.2d 451 (S.C. 1979); Plaza Development. Services. v. Joe
Harden Builder, Inc., 365 S.E.2d 231 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988)). The court pointed to South Carolina precedent allowing consolidated arbitration and recognized that some jurisdictions foreclosed class arbitration*16 based on
their own state rules against consolidated arbitration. Pet. App. 21a.
The court described its decision to reject implied waiver of class arbitration as serving important state interests
that are directly implicated in this case. “If we enforced a mandatory, adhesive arbitration clause, but prohibited
class actions in arbitration where the agreement is silent, the drafting party could effectively prevent class actions against it without having to say it was doing so in the agreement.” Pet. App. 22a. Such a result would
thwart South Carolina's interest in vindicating its consumer protection laws. Indeed, under petitioner's approach,
“parties with nominal individual claims, but with significant collective claims, would be left with no avenue for
relief and the drafting party with no check on its abuses of the law. Further, hearing such claims (involving
identical issues against one defendant) individually, in court or before an arbitrator, does not serve the interest of
judicial economy.” Pet. App. 22a.
The state supreme court also analyzed whether, notwithstanding state law permitting class arbitrations, federal
law compelled the opposite result. The court observed that some federal courts had followed Champ v. Siegel
Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995), to deny class arbitration in cases brought in federal court under FAA §
4. The court reasoned that it was not obliged to follow Champ because that case articulated an exclusively
“federal approach” based on an application of § 4, which by its plain terms governs only a petition to a “United
States district court.” Pet. App. 12a n.11, 20a. The court noted that the judgment sustaining the arbitration award
had particular force given the limited scope of judicial review of arbitration decisions under both federal and
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South Carolina law. Pet. App. 23a (citing Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (2001)
(per curiam); Pittman Mortgage Co. v. Edwards, 488 S.E.2d 335, 337-38 (S.C. 1997) (interpreting *17S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-48-130, the state-law analogue to FAA § 10)). To overturn an arbitrator's decision, as Green Tree itself acknowledged, it must show that “the arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it,
and the law disregarded was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.” Pet. App. 24a (citing
Green Tree brief and state case) (emphasis in opinion). Because “the arbitrator did not act in manifest disregard
of the law by permitting [the class arbitration] to proceed,” the court upheld the arbitrator's awards in both the
Bazzle and Lackey cases. Id.
Green Tree and its amici also asserted that the due process rights of absent class members were violated by the
classwide arbitration, but the court held that Green Tree had failed to preserve that claim, and that, in any event,
there was “no evidence that the rights of the absent class members were not protected in this case.” Pet. App.
25a. Acknowledging that “protection of the due process rights of absent class members is an essential component of all class actions, and one which may necessitate particular attention in class-wide arbitrations,” the court
observed that the class members' rights in this case “appear to have been properly protected by the notice given
[FN8]
to all of them,” and the corresponding right to opt out. Id. at 26a.
FN8. In December 2002, petitioner filed for relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code. Substantially all of petitioner's assets are being sold and petitioner is being liquidated. The judgment of the
South Carolina Supreme Court in this case is secured by bonds, but if that judgment were reversed and
these 3,700 consumers remitted to individual arbitrations, they likely would have limited, if any, recourse for petitioner's violation of law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The South Carolina Supreme Court applied ordinary state contract doctrine to hold that the arbitration clause
“does not limit the arbitration to non-class arbitration,” Pet. App. 19a, and thus permits class-wide arbitration in
the arbitrator's discretion as authorized by South Carolina law, id. at 21a-22a. The parties' agreement did not
specify the procedures to be used in arbitration under it, but did specify that South Carolina law would govern.
Under South Carolina law, class arbitration is permissible in appropriate circumstances where the parties' agreement does not foreclose it.
Petitioner urges reversal, as a matter of federal law, on the ground that the state high court misread the parties'
contract. Arguing that the FAA mandates enforcement of arbitration agreements “in accordance with their written terms,” petitioner attempts to spin a preemptive federal rule of arbitration-contract interpretation from snippets of language taken out of context from this Court's cases. Under petitioner's proposed rule, any party displeased with a state court's interpretation of an arbitration agreement would have a federal claim that the contract was not interpreted “in accordance with its written terms.” The FAA effected no such wholesale federalization of matters of state law.
There is no express or field preemption under the FAA. Conflict preemption under the Act is limited to state law
that discriminates against or disfavors arbitration as such, and the decision here did neither. This Court's references to the enforcement of arbitration agreements “according to their terms” are simply directives to ensure that
courts repudiate historical practices of voiding arbitration agreements due to a bias in favor of adjudication, and
instead interpret those agreements neutrally under ordinary principles of state law. That language was not meant
to displace routine state-law contract interpretation with federal law.
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To the contrary, it is well settled that “the interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law”
under the FAA. Volt Info. Sciences Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989). The state supreme court
faithfully interpreted the Agreement in accordance with generally applicable principles of state law to permit the
arbitrator to conduct a class arbitration. The contract contains no prohibition on class arbitrations, grants the arbitrator all powers under the law including equitable powers, and authorizes arbitration of all disputes arising
from or related to the contract or the parties' relationship. Because the South Carolina Court's routine application
of ordinary state contract law principles to this agreement neither discriminated against nor disfavored arbitration, there is no ground for federal preemption here.
Nor is there any warrant in the FAA to fashion a special federal background rule that would prohibit class arbitration unless the parties' agreement explicitly authorized it. The Court in Volt recognized that the FAA leaves
room for states to fashion their own procedures to facilitate multiparty arbitration. Class arbitration meshes even
more comfortably with the FAA than the rule in Volt providing for stays of arbitration pending related litigation.
It would distort the FAA beyond recognition to find in it presumptive mistrust of arbitrators' abilities to handle
potentially complex procedures like class arbitration. As petitioner itself acknowledges, the FAA does not establish any inherent clash between arbitration and class actions. Pet. Br. 32 (“No one can doubt that the parties to
an arbitration could agree to proceed in such a fashion.”), id. at 42. The FAA's complete silence on class arbitration, together with the compatibility of class treatment and arbitration as a practical matter, shows the FAA's
lack of any preemptive effect here.
Petitioner does not argue that the arbitrator misapplied class action standards. Here, each and every one of the
numerous class members was governed by the same agreement to arbitrate, their identical underlying claims all
were subject to arbitration, the case unquestionably met the State's standards for class certification, and only
those persons who did not opt out of the class proceeding before the arbitrator were included. This case was an
ideal candidate for class arbitration, and the arbitrator successfully conducted a class arbitration. Nor is petitioner claiming that the arbitrator erred in finding it liable with respect to anyone in the respondent class. The illegality of Green Tree's challenged conduct has long been clear.
Petitioner's objective here is instead to find a way to avoid having to pay each person whose rights it admittedly
violated. Despite earlier awards against it in individual cases raising the same claim, Green Tree persisted for
years in violating the Consumer Code in thousands of additional transactions in South Carolina. Now that it has
been held liable to a class, it argues that the FAA forecloses class arbitration, and that the agreement to arbitrate
silently waived the right to sue on a class-wide basis. The FAA has no such effect. It does not displace state law
that permits class arbitration. Class arbitration here, under a contract that did not purport to foreclose it, served
the State's interest in effective and efficient enforcement of is laws, and did so in a manner fully consistent with
the FAA.
ARGUMENT
I. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION TO PERMIT ARBITRATION OF CLASS
CLAIMS FULLY COMPORTS WITH THE FAA
A. Under the FAA, State Law and Arbitrator Discretion Supply Rules of Arbitration Procedure Not Specified in
an Agreement to Arbitrate
The decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court fully accords with the parties' Agreement and the text and
purposes of the FAA. As that court held, the parties' Agreement *21 places no limits on an arbitrator's ability to
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conduct class arbitration. See Pet. App. 19a; see also Point II, infra. The only matter of arbitration procedure directly addressed by the agreement in this case is the unavailability of a jury. Pet. App. 110a. Such lack of any
other specification leaves matters of arbitration procedure to the arbitrator's discretion, within the parameters set
by state law and the FAA. The arbitrator was thus free to proceed on a class-wide basis in a fitting case, and he
appropriately elected to do so here.
The FAA says nothing about the procedures to arbitrate state-law claims. Section 7 of the FAA-which gives arbitrators power, backed by the federal courts, to summon witnesses to arbitration-is the only provision of the Act
that addresses arbitration procedures, and even that provision is directed exclusively to federal cases. 9 U.S.C. §
[FN9]
7 (referring to “United States district court” and “courts of the United States”).
The FAA does not speak to
whether an arbitrator may permit plaintiffs to proceed on a class basis, for “there is no federal law favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules.” Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1984) (“The procedures to be used in an arbitration are
not prescribed by the [FAA]”).
FN9. State law provides the analogous procedure for state arbitrations. S. Car. Code Ann. § 15-48-10
(providing subpoena power to state arbitrators).
Selection of arbitration procedures not specified by an arbitration agreement or mandated by state law rests
within the arbitrator's discretion. “[P]rocedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition' are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 (2002) (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)).
*22 Even if there were some doubt that the agreement in this case left to the arbitrator the choice of arbitration
procedures, including class arbitration, his decision to proceed on a class basis must be accorded great deference. It is well settled that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal
policy favoring arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (S.C. 2001) (“unless the court can say with positive assurance
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the dispute, arbitration [of the disputed question] should be ordered”). Thus, in deciding whether the parties' agreement authorized the arbitrator
to certify a class, this Court should resolve any doubts about the matter in favor of the arbitrator's decision. Matters within an arbitrator's power, such as the procedures for conducting the arbitration, are ordinarily subject to
only the most limited and deferential judicial review. Major League Baseball Players' Assoc. v. Garvey, 532
U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (per curiam) (judicial review of arbitration decision is “very limited,” warranted only when
the arbitrator “strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively ‘dispenses his own
brand of … justice’ ”); Pittman Mortgage Co. v. Edwards, 488 S.E.2d 423, 337-38 (S.C. 1997) (arbitral awards
subject to narrow review under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-130(a)).
B.FAA § 2 Preemption Is Limited to Ensuring that State Law Does Not Disfavor Arbitration
FAA preemption is narrow. “The FAA contains no express preemption provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration.” Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468,
477 (1989). Thus, petitioner must depend on conflict preemption, which requires a showing that the state rule
would “actually conflict *23 with federal law” by “standing as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” id. at 477 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)). The guiding rule is that preemption is disfavored, English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990), es-
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pecially where the federal law with which the state decision assertedly conflicts is completely silent on the matter, see Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995), as the FAA is on class arbitration.
There is no FAA preemption here. The principal preemptive thrust of the FAA is to displace state laws that
would frustrate the parties' choice to arbitrate rather than litigate. To that end, FAA § 2 states that
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2. Congress thereby “withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at
10; see Green Tree Financial Corp. of Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (emphasizing purpose of
FAA “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements”). This Court has held that the FAA
applies to state-law disputes such as this one in a very limited fashion, for the specific purpose of overriding
state-law favoritism toward judicial rather than arbitral resolution.
This Court has identified only two categories of state law that are subject to conflict preemption under Section 2,
neither of which is applicable here: First, the FAA displaces state-law principles that target arbitration agreements for *24 special or different treatment from other contracts, on the ground that such arbitration-specific
law “would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the [FAA's] language and Congress's intent.” Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996) (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos., Inc., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995)). “Congress precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status.” Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. The Court in Casarotto accordingly held that FAA § 2
preempts Montana law that imposed special notice requirements only on contracts “subject to arbitration.” Id. at
683. In Allied-Bruce, the Court applied the anti-targeting principle to hold that FAA § 2 preempts Alabama law
categorically invalidating written, pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265. Second, the
FAA preempts state law that would exempt certain categories of cases from arbitration, because such state law
evinces the very mistrust of arbitration that the FAA serves to counteract. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987) (FAA § 2 preempts California law exempting wage claims from arbitration); Southland Corp, 465 U.S. 1
(FAA § 2 preempts provision of California Franchise Investment Law that state courts had interpreted to exempt
from arbitration claims arising under that law).
Neither of those categories of preemption ousts South Carolina law permitting class arbitration under contracts
that allow for it. Aggregation of like claims subject to the same arbitration agreement does not “place arbitration
clauses on an unequal ‘footing’ ” with other contracts in violation of the Casarotto anti-discrimination principle.
Given that claims relating to the same contract could be pursued in court on a class-wide basis, the mere pres[FN10]
ence of an arbitration clause should not, under Casarotto, make class proceedings *25 unavailable.
Nor
does the state court's decision evince the mistrust of or hostility toward arbitration condemned in Perry. To the
contrary, allowing arbitrators to manage important cases with procedural sophistication shows equal respect for,
[FN11]
rather than skepticism of, the arbitral forum.
FN10. Indeed, the very claim at issue in this case proceeded to judgment in a class action in state court
brought by those purchasers whose contracts with Green Tree did not contain arbitration clauses, and
whom the arbitrator therefore excluded from the arbitration classes. See Flemmings v. Green Tree Fin.
Corp., note 5, supra, at 9.
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FN11. Petitioner and its amici intimate that permitting class arbitration is somehow anti-arbitration because it raises the prospect that some arbitrations could come to resemble litigation, to the point where
certain parties might no longer find arbitration so attractive. Pet. Br. 39-41; e.g. Brief of Washington
Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae, at 13 (“The real danger here is that by imposing class-based arbitration procedures in the face of a silent arbitration clause, the South Carolina courts are discouraging
parties from agreeing to arbitration in future cases.”); Brief for American Bankers' Assn. et al., as Amici
Curiae, at 18. Although arbitration, even on a class basis, may often be simpler and faster than a trial,
the FAA simply does not promise any particular level of simplicity or relative economy; “potential
complexity should not suffice to ward off arbitration.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985); see Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232
(1987) (rejecting arguments that Securities and RICO claims are non-arbitrable due to their complexity). This Court's endorsement in Mitsubishi Motors of arbitration of antitrust violations, which “can affect hundreds of thousands-perhaps millions-of people and inflict staggering economic damage,” 473
U.S. 614, 655 (Stevens, J, dissenting), belies any assertion that complex matters cannot be arbitrated.
The same “adaptability and access to expertise,” id. at 633-634, that make antitrust, securities and
RICO claims not inherently unsuited to arbitration support confidence in arbitrators' ability to conduct
class
proceedings.
See
generally
American
Arbitration
Association
website,
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15739 (“Over the last several decades, the American Arbitration Association has administered over 100,000 mass claims cases for a wide range of class action and
mass claims involving insurance, bankruptcy and discrimination matters.”)
*26 II. THE FAA DOES NOT ESTABLISH A FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION UNDER WHICH THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT'S REFERENCE TO “THIS CONTRACT”
WOULD FORECLOSE CLASS ARBITRATION
Petitioner does not challenge the South Carolina Supreme Court's reading of the Agreement, under South Carolina law, as allowing class arbitration-indeed, this Court has no authority to review that determination of state
law. Nor does petitioner maintain that the FAA expressly or implicitly precludes all class arbitration. To the
contrary, it expressly concedes that parties may choose to proceed on a class-wide basis in arbitrations governed
by the FAA. Pet. Br. 32, 42.
Petitioner is thus reduced to arguing that an asserted FAA requirement that contracts to arbitrate be “enforced
according to their written terms” establishes a body of federal contract law for interpretation of arbitration
agreements that would authorize federal courts to second-guess state law. But there is nothing in the FAA to
suggest that Congress authorized the federal courts to create a common law of arbitration contracts. Because it
cannot point to any general FAA prohibition of class actions, petitioner is left with the case-specific contention
that the contract language in this case precludes class arbitration.
If this Court were to accept petitioner's position, it would invite any party unhappy with the results of a state
court's or an arbitrator's interpretation of an arbitration agreement to seek review of routine questions of contract
interpretation in federal court by casting its complaint as one of misinterpretation-or in petitioner's terms,
“rewriting”-of the contract rather than enforcement “according to its written terms.” The FAA establishes no
such federal rule, but trusts the state courts neutrally to apply their own contract law to determine the meaning of
arbitration clauses. Cf. *27American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232 (1995) (finding nonpreemption
where it was implausible that Congress intended to channel into federal court large body of routine common-law
contract claims).
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The arbitrator and the state courts here faithfully applied well-established South Carolina law of contract interpretation, pursuant to a contract that expressly called for the application of South Carolina law. Neither the arbitrator, nor any of the numerous judges that Green Tree entreated to halt the class arbitration in this case, agreed
[FN12]
with Green Tree's interpretation of the Agreement.
The FAA reserves interpretation of state arbitration
agreements to the state courts, and the South Carolina Supreme Court's judgment accords with the FAA and is
not subject to second-guessing by this Court.
FN12. The state courts, as well as the arbitrator, time and again rejected Green Tree's interpretation of
the Agreement as foreclosing class arbitration. See, e.g., Pet. App. 19a (unanimous opinion of South
Carolina Supreme Court); R. App. 1346-1347 (opinion of Dorchester County Circuit Judge Patrick R.
Watts in Bazzle denying defendant's motion for reconsideration of class certification); R. App. 49a-50a
(opinion of Barnwell County Chief Circuit Judge Rodney A. Peeples in Lackey denying defendant's motion to vacate arbitral award); R. App. 63-64 (opinion of Barnwell County Circuit Judge Gary E. Clary
dismissing Green Tree's collateral action to stay class arbitration).
A. Under the FAA, General Principles of State Law Govern Questions of Interpretation of Arbitration Agreements
Petitioner pins its case on assertions that the Agreement must be read according to its written terms, see e.g. Pet.
Br. at 18-22, and that those terms “foreclose” class arbitration. Pet. Br. 42; see also id. at 17 (“the parties' intent
is expressly to the contrary” of the state rule permitting class arbitration); id. at 37 (asserting that “express limitations” of the contract *28 foreclose class arbitration). Under the FAA, however, the state's high court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the contract terms. The question whether the Agreement in this case permitted the
arbitrator to conduct class arbitration is a matter of state law, which the arbitrator and state courts resolved in respondents' favor.
The FAA preserves a substantial role for state law in the interpretation and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. As this Court has repeatedly made clear, “States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles.” Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281. Notwithstanding the FAA, “the interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.” Volt, 489
U.S. at 474. See also Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n. 9 (state legislative and judicial law is applicable to arbitration
contracts if it deals with “contracts generally” and does not construe arbitration agreements “in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law”). As Allied-Bruce,
Perry, and Volt make clear, the general contract law that applies in a case such as this is state, not federal, law.
Indeed, there is no general federal common law of contract interpretation, see O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512
U.S. 79, 83 (1994), and the FAA is not a mandate to create one, cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957).
Green Tree attempts to characterize language from this Court's cases as supporting special federal review to ensure that arbitration agreements are enforced “according to their written terms.” That is exactly what the South
Carolina Supreme Court did in this case. The Court refers to enforcement of arbitration agreements “in accordance with their terms” simply to mean that arbitration agreements should be interpreted in the same manner as
any other contract. For example, the Court stated in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938
(1995) that *29 “commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are enforced according to their terms
and according to the intentions of the parties.” 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Volt the
Court explained that the FAA “simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate,
like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.” 489 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added). The point of the refer-
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ence to enforcement of arbitration agreements “in accordance with their terms” is not to impose a layer of
routine federal oversight of questions of arbitration agreement interpretation, but simply to place interpretation
of those agreements on the same footing as other contracts, that is, precisely to ensure that they are governed by
generally applicable principles of state contract law. None of the cases in which this Court has referred to enforcement of arbitration agreements “in accordance with their terms” had anything to do with the supposed tension between class actions and arbitration that petitioner urges, nor, indeed, with any presumption against particular procedures on the ground that they might be ill-suited to arbitration. There is absolutely no evidence that
Congress in enacting the FAA sought to federalize routine matters of state court contract interpretation, as petitioner's argument necessarily implies.
Petitioner's argument not only mischaracterizes the precedent, but also fails in its own terms. Where, as here, an
agreement does not purport to bar class arbitration, it is difficult to see how class proceedings could have been
other than “in accordance with the terms” of the Agreement. Volt acknowledges the latitude parties enjoy “to
choose the terms under which they will arbitrate,” 489 U.S. at 472, but there is no requirement that the parties
must specifically address in advance all procedural issues that might arise in an arbitration. If this Court's reference to arbitration “in accordance with the terms” of the agreement carried the *30 restrictive force that petitioner ascribes to those words, arbitrations would grind to a halt. For example, Green Tree's Agreement in this case
made no provision for discovery within the arbitration, the order of motions and proof to be submitted to the arbitrator, or other procedural matters that the arbitrator addressed. Under petitioner's approach of exclusive reliance on authority spelled out in the contract, even an individual plaintiff's claim could not have been arbitrated
under this Agreement. Because the state court's interpretation of the Agreement did not discriminate against arbitration and was not hostile to arbitration, its resolution of state law is not preempted by the FAA.
B. The State Court Faithfully Applied State Law To Hold That The Agreement Permitted Class Arbitration
Even if the FAA were construed to authorize federal court review of state court contract interpretation, there
would be no basis for overturning the decision below. The South Carolina Supreme Court, applying arbitrationneutral rules of contract interpretation, concluded that the Agreement was “at best” ambiguous with respect to
class arbitration. Pet. App. 19a. In interpreting the Agreement, the court applied the entirely unexceptional, generally applicable state-law rule that an ambiguity in contract terms “should be construed against the drafter.” Pet.
[FN13]
[FN14]
App. 19a. That principle is well settled in South Carolina,
as well as many other *31 jurisdictions.
This Court has itself, in reviewing a federal-court FAA case, approved of the precise rule the South Carolina
court used here: “the common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous language against the interests of the party that drafted it.” Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52,
62 (1995).
FN13. See, e.g., Myrtle Beach Lumber Co., Inc. v. Willoughby, 274 S.E.2d 423, 426 (S.C. 1981) (cited
in opinion below, Pet. App. 17a); Southern Atlantic Fin. Services., Inc., v. Middleton, 562 S.E.2d 482,
486 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (“It is well settled that ambiguities arising within a contract must be construed
against the drafter. This rule applies with particular force in cases involving a contract of adhesion.”);
Ralph K. Anderson, Jr., South Carolina Requests to Charge-Civil § 19-7, Contract-Rules of Construction (2002) (standard jury instruction stating that “ambiguities must be construed against the party who
prepared the contract …. Where a contract is entered into upon a form prepared by a party, the language
of the contract will be strictly construed against that party.”)
FN14. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981) (“In choosing among the reasonable mean-
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ings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.”).
1. The State Court's Decision Is Strongly Supported By State Law and the Terms of the Agreement
The language in Green Tree's Agreement creates an implication in respondents' favor considerably stronger than
the one this Court credited in Mastrobuono. While the agreement does not use the words “class-wide arbitra[FN15]
tion” or “class action,”
it can be read affirmatively to authorize such a procedure, and certainly provides
no more than the most strained support for petitioner's contrary reading.
FN15. Compare Green Tree's revised standard form contract containing an express waiver of buyers'
rights to bring participate in class actions, supra at 3-4.
First, the Agreement's own choice-of-law clause authorized the application of South Carolina law to the arbitration in this case, and South Carolina law permits class actions in arbitration as well as litigation. See S.C.R. Civ.
P. 23 (authorizing class actions); Pet. App. 21a (“no case law or statute in South Carolina prohibits class-wide
arbitration”) (citing *32Episcopal Housing Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 255 S.E.2d 451 (S.C.1979) (authorizing
consolidated arbitration in appropriate circumstances)). Green Tree's contract expressly states that “this contract
will be governed by the law of the State of South Carolina.” R. App. 2162. The Agreement fails to specify any
other set of procedural rules to govern the arbitration, making state law a natural source to fill that gap. Under
South Carolina law, “state procedural rules that do not undermine the enforceability of an otherwise valid contract to arbitrate may be deemed to have been incorporated into a contract through choice of law provisions.”
Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (S.C. 2001). Green Tree's own choice-of-law provision
[FN16]
thus incorporates the South Carolina default rule permitting class arbitration.
FN16. Mastrobuono's treatment of the New York choice-of-law provision is not to the contrary. There
was language in the Mastrobuono contract that contradicted application of the choice-of-law clause to
the disputed damages question, 514 U.S. 58-59, and such contradictory language is lacking here.
Moreover, as the Court noted in Mastrobuono, it was reviewing “a federal court's interpretation of [a]
contract,” which was not entitled to any special deference. The precedent more relevant to a state case
like this one is Volt, in which the contractual choice of state law supported application of state multiparty arbitration rules. This case, like Volt, 489 U.S. 486, is governed by the rule of “defer[ence] to the
[state] court's construction of its own State's law.” Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 60 n. 4 (distinguishing
Volt on that ground).
Second, the Agreement expressly grants to the arbitrator “all powers provided by the law and the contract,”
which are fairly understood to include the authority to certify a class. The power to certify a class is a power
provided by South Carolina law, even if it is not otherwise expressly provided by a contract. See R. App. 62-63
(trial court refusing to enjoin class arbitration because contract's “all powers provided by the law” clause authorizes it).
Third, the Agreement gives the arbitrator power over “all disputes” arising under any source of law whatsoever.
Just as *33 the reference to “any controversy” in the agreement at issue in Mastrobuono supported the arbitrator's authority to award punitive damages, so, too, the broad reference to “all disputes” in the Green Tree agreement permits the arbitrator to decide whether the arbitration should proceed on a classwide basis. See also Conn.
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 210 F.3d 771, 774, (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.)
(applying “usual methods of contract interpretation” to hold that agreement to arbitrate “any dispute arising out
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of the interpretation, performance or breach of this Agreement “authorized consolidation of arbitration because
“the word ‘dispute’ … does not exclude a dispute involving multiple parties”).
Fourth, the Agreement specifies that the arbitrator's authority is not limited to simple contract remedies, but includes “equitable” powers. That reference can reasonably be read to encompass authority to certify a class.
“[T]he class action was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of
those interested in the litigation was too great to permit joinder.” Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808
(1985) (emphasis added); see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832-837 (1999); Dickler v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton Inc., 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. 1991) (holding that authority to conduct class arbitration is an equitable
power of the arbitrator).
Fifth, the contract's express waiver of the right to a jury implies that other questions of arbitration procedure
were left to background principles of law and the arbitrator's discretion. South Carolina courts recognize as a
general matter of contract interpretation that “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” i.e., the expression of one
thing implies the exclusion of another. Evins v. Richland County Historic Preservation Comm'n, 532 S.E.2d 876
(S.C. 2000). That principle suggests that the Agreement, which expressly required buyers *34 to waive their jury
trial rights, did not effect a waiver of any other specific procedures.
Petitioner's principal argument is that the Agreement's reference to disputes arising from or relating to “this contract” precludes class arbitration. But the clause in which that phrase appears refers to the underlying substantive
claims and defenses that must be arbitrated, and not to the procedures that the arbitrator should use in conducting the arbitration. It states:
All disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result
from this contract, or the validity of this arbitration clause or the entire contract, shall be resolved by binding arbitration ….
Pet. App. 110a. That clause does not address multiparty issues at all, but only makes clear that the agreement to
arbitrate encompasses not only contract claims as such, but related tort or statutory claims, as well as gateway issues such as the validity of the Agreement. As Petitioner itself characterizes it, that clause “identifies the matters
that will be subject to arbitration.” Pet. Br. 8. There is no question that the underlying claims of all the class
members “relate[d]” to the identical contracts they entered with Green Tree. Given that the law in South Carolina does not prevent an individual party to a bilateral contract to act as a class representative in order to pursue
claims relating to that contract in a class action, there is no reason to think that the arbitrator would lack the
power to authorize a plaintiff to play a similar representative role in an appropriate case pending in arbitration. If
the Agreement contained the same sentence, but with the word “litigation” in place of “binding arbitration,”
nobody would contend that the terms operated sub silentio to foreclose class actions.
Even assuming the reference to “this contract” could somehow be read to be relevant to procedures rather than
to the *35 substantive matters to be arbitrated, it would not foreclose class arbitration. It provides for arbitration,
not just of claims “arising from” the contract, but of any “disputes … relating to this contract or the relationships
which result from this contract.” The dispute over whether class arbitration is permissible “relates to” the contract and the relationships that derive therefrom. It is a dispute about whether the named plaintiffs may, in the
context of their suit against the defendant, play a role as representatives of other persons similarly situated with
respect to the defendant. The dispute also “relates to” the substantive “claims” because it turns on the typicality
and commonality of the named plaintiffs' claims vis-a-vis those of the unnamed class members. The sentence is
devoid of limiting language that would support the notion that the arbitrator could consider only procedural is-
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sues relating exclusively to the two parties and not to identical claims presented by similarly situated others under the same contract language.
Green Tree's reliance on the clause referring to “arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with consent of you”
fares no better. That clause sets forth the parties' respective roles in the selection of an arbitrator. It plainly was
not designed to limit the scope of any arbitral dispute to one that is necessarily “bilateral.” Pet. Br. 39. Nor does
the clause guarantee Green Tree the right “to select, in the first instance, the individual who would have authority to resolve the disputes arising from or relating to each specific contract.” Id. at 43.
Indeed, that argument is wholly circular: If the Agreement is otherwise consistent with class arbitration, as we
have argued and the state high court held, then Green Tree's selection of an arbitrator for any given plaintiff's
claim was subject to the possibility that the case might go forward under that arbitrator on a class-wide basis.
That argument is also particularly weak in this case because plaintiffs filed class *36 complaints in both Bazzle
and Lackey, putting Green Tree on actual notice in both cases that its selection of an arbitrator for each case
would (unless one of its other anti-class-arbitration arguments prevailed) amount to selection for purposes of the
[FN17]
class action.
FN17. The unnamed class members' fight under the Agreement to withhold their consent to Green
Tree's selected arbitrator was preserved by the right to opt out of the plaintiff classes-a right which several class members elected to exercise. Moreover, in the context of a class action, the reference to “you”
may be read as plural. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 775 (Posner, J.) (reading reference to
“each party” in context of arbitrator selection provision to refer to each “side” in the dispute).
Green Tree's contention that the Agreement precludes class arbitration is utterly implausible. As we have shown,
the Agreement's terms, viewed evenhandedly under South Carolina contract law, squarely refute Green Tree's
objection that class arbitration is contractually “foreclosed.” Pet. Br. 42. The Agreement does not specifically
mention class proceedings, just as the contract in Mastrobuono did not mention “punitive damages,” but the
Agreement here, as there, “strongly implies” the disputed coverage. 514 U.S. at 60. Green Tree is responsible
for any ambiguity in its Agreement, and thus “cannot now claim the benefit of the doubt.” Mastrobuono, 514
U.S. at 63.
2. There is No Basis for Petitioner's Contention That The State Court “Rewrote” The Parties' Agreement in Order To Serve its Own Policy Preferences
Only in the most exceptional cases, in which a state court has somehow distorted its law in a manner that discriminates against or is hostile to arbitration rights, are questions of state law subject to preemption under the
FAA. See Point I. B., supra. Petitioner can show no such discrimination or hostility,*37 and accordingly resorts
to inflated rhetoric, asserting repeatedly that the state court “modified,” “rewrote,” “reformed,” “distorted” or
“attempted to improve upon” the written terms of the parties' contract, “disregarding” or “ignoring” Green Tree's
chosen language in order to “impose,” “intrude” or “superimpose” on it the court's own policy preferences. See,
e.g., Pet. Br. 3, 4, 5, 15, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32. Shorn of the rhetoric, however, petitioner's argument
amounts to nothing more than a quibble with the arbitrator's and the state court's uniform interpretation of the
contract. All of Green Tree's expressions of outrage do not change the fact that, even if the state court erred in
applying its own law, which it plainly did not, there is no federal issue in this case.
For example, petitioner decries what it characterizes as the State “impos[ing] on the parties its own notions of
‘efficiency and equity.’ ” Pet. Br. 32; id. at 3. The court did no such thing. Rather, as explained above, the court
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applied ordinary, arbitration-neutral principles of contract interpretation and found that the Agreement was at
best ambiguous regarding class arbitration and that, under state law, class arbitration procedures were therefore
available in appropriate cases. Petitioner wholly miscasts the role of the “efficiency and equity” inquiry to which
the state court referred. Far from signaling any free-ranging power to rewrite contracts to suit the court's own
notions of fairness, the terms refer to considerations relevant to an arbitrator's decision whether to certify a class
where class procedures are an available option under the contract.
III. THE FAA DOES NOT CREATE A FEDERAL PRESUMPTION AGAINST CLASS ARBITRATION
THAT WOULD FORECLOSE CLASS ARBITRATION HERE
Where, as here, an agreement to arbitrate does not expressly provide for or prohibit class arbitration, the South
[FN18]
*38 Carolina background rule permits it. Although another state might apply a different default rule,
there is no preemptive FAA background rule against class arbitration that foreclosed South Carolina state law
from permitting it here. Indeed, petitioner's concession (Pet. Br. 32) that parties are free to agree to class-wide
arbitration without running afoul of the FAA makes any suggestion of an inherent conflict untenable.
FN18. Compare Med Center Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9, 19-20 (Ala. 1998) (denying class arbitration where agreement did not specifically provide for it) with Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
596 A.2d 860 (Pa. 1991) (allowing class arbitration as within arbitrator's equitable powers); Keating v.
Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (allowing class arbitration where agreement does not foreclose it); Blue Cross of
California v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (finding state rule permitting
class arbitration not preempted by FAA); Boynton v. Carswell, 233 S.E. 2d 185 (Ga. 1977) (allowing
class arbitration in challenges to local taxes), overruled on other grounds by Callaway v. Carswell, 242
S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 1978).
A. The FAA Does Not Preempt State Court Procedures For Multiparty Arbitration
Conflict preemption requires a showing that state law actually conflicts with federal law. Yet the FAA is wholly
agnostic as to class arbitration. Petitioner consequently cannot point to any actual conflict here.
This Court in Volt recognized that state procedures for multiparty arbitration are compatible with the FAA. The
Court ruled that the FAA did not preempt a state-law procedural rule that authorized arbitration of state-law
claims to be stayed pending litigation of related claims among parties not subject to arbitration. 489 U.S. 468.
As the Court noted, “the FAA itself contains no provision designed to deal with the special practical problems
that arise in multiparty contractual disputes when some or all of the contracts at issue include contracts to arbitrate.” Id. at 476 n. 5. California *39 “ha[d] taken the lead in fashioning a legislative response to this problem, by
giving courts authority to consolidate or stay arbitration proceedings in these situations in order to minimize the
potential for contradictory judgments.” Id. Application of the California rule was arguably hostile to arbitration
because it allowed the state court to stay arbitration pending the resolution of related litigation, the result of
which might then control the arbitration. The Court in Volt nonetheless found no actual conflict with the FAA's
“healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration,” id. at 475, and thus no preemption.
Under Volt, South Carolina's approval here of class arbitration is a fortiori not preempted by the FAA. Like the
agreement in Volt, Green Tree's Agreement included a clause specifying that state law would govern. R. App.
2162. South Carolina, like California in Volt, has expressed its own state policy with respect to a question of
multiparty arbitration. Here, the state has chosen not to foreclose a class proceeding where an agreement allows
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it and the arbitrator has elected to permit it. Because it facilitates arbitration, South Carolina's rule is even more
compatible with the FAA than the California rule at issue in Volt.
The arbitrator did in fact conduct class arbitration here, and South Carolina's allowance of it eased rather than
obstructed arbitration of the parties' disputes. Respondents here do not assert an entitlement to bring a class action that would divert the case from arbitration into court. Unlike the plaintiff in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), they do not rely on class-action rights as a ground for relief from an agreement
to arbitrate. Id. at 32 (rejecting contention that potential unavailability of class arbitration of ADEA claim
renders it unfit for arbitration). Rather, respondents joined together as a class in order more efficiently to resolve
their claims within arbitration. Nothing in this Court's FAA preemption jurisprudence suggests that application
to arbitration*40 agreements of arbitration-neutral state law which facilitates arbitration is at odds with the
[FN19]
FAA.
FN19. This case does not present the question whether the FAA preempts state law that abrogates express waivers of rights to proceed on a class basis, such as by rendering unconscionable contracts that
waive the right to proceed as a class. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); State v.
Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002), cert. denied sub nom Friedman's Inc. v. West Virginia, 123
S.Ct. 695 (2002).
Petitioner identifies only one lower-court case, Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995), to
support its contention that the FAA mandates a presumption against class arbitration. Champ does not apply
here, however, because it rests on FAA § 4, which is inapplicable in state court. By their own terms, each of the
FAA procedural provisions that addresses trial-court procedures at the threshold of arbitration applies only to
federal courts and does not address the role of state courts. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (regarding procedure to be used in
“any United States district court” to initiate arbitration in cases presenting federal claims); id. § 3 (regarding
procedure for obtaining a stay of litigation “brought in any of the courts of the United States” pending completion of arbitration); Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.10. Such a “federal procedural right … simply does not apply in
a nonfederal forum.” Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921 (1997).
Even if the FAA's procedural provisions supported a presumption against class arbitration in federal court, those
provisions in no way bar states from authorizing their trial courts to make class certification decisions before
sending cases to arbitration. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 476-477; Southland, 465 U.S. at 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(state courts should be allowed to fashion their own procedures for enforcing the substantive federal rights, if
any, that the FAA creates). There is no more cause for petitioner's concern (Pet. Br. 28) about potentially different state and federal threshold procedures for arbitration than there is about the routine use of *41 different procedures in state and federal courts under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See American
Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 451-452 (1994) (despite potential disuniformity, Jones Act does not pree[FN20]
mpt state law on forum non conveniens for cases brought in state court under the Act).
FN20. Whether to certify a class is plainly a procedural question. Indeed, if it were otherwise, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 would run afoul of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072. Both federal
and state class-action rules comfortably qualify as rules that regulate only procedure because they address the “process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464
(1965) (emphasis added). In the arbitration context, the nature of the question whether to proceed on a
class-wide basis is no different.
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In light of the sovereign autonomy of the states to structure their own court procedures as they see fit, it is
doubtful whether Congress could, consistent with constitutional principles of federalism, preempt state-court
procedures for certifying a class at the threshold of arbitration. At a minimum, a plain statement of Congress's
intent to do so should be required before state courts' procedural rules are ousted. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 460 (1991). Yet the FAA says nothing whatsoever about state procedures, much less class arbitrations,
apart from the general nondiscrimination principle it embodies. The states ordinarily “have great latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts,” and a “neutral state rule regarding the administration
of the state courts” should not lightly be preempted. Fankell, 520 U.S. at 919 (citing, inter alia, Southland, 465
U.S. at 33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)); Southland, 465 U.S. at 19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“we must be cautious in construing the act lest we excessively encroach on the powers which Congressional policy, if not the Constitution, would reserve to the States”). Any reading *42 of the FAA to control statecourt procedures for referral of cases to class arbitration raises constitutional doubts and should be avoided.
Petitioner seeks to sidestep the fact that FAA §§ 3 and 4 expressly apply only to federal courts by asserting that
the parties nonetheless agreed that these sections would govern any arbitration under the contract, even one that
never made it to federal court. Pet. Br. 16, 28-30. The Agreement supports no such interpretation. The sole sentence upon which petitioner relies states that “[t]his arbitration contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. section 1.” Pet. App. 110a.
It refers only to FAA § 1, not § 3 or § 4, and its reference to § 1, defining “commerce” under the Act, establishes
only that the parties thought that the contract affected interstate commerce within the meaning of the FAA. In
the case of purely intra-state contracts, the FAA lacks even the limited preemptive force of its § 2 nondiscrimination principle, and states are free to favor or disfavor arbitration relative to other forms of dispute res[FN21]
olution as they see fit.
In this case, even though the Agreement governs real property transactions occurring within the State of South Carolina and thus is arguably at the outer edge of Congress's regulatory power, the
contract's reference to the FAA suggests that the parties contemplated that their agreement involved interstate
[FN22]
*43 commerce.
That limited reference lends no support to petitioner's contention that FAA § 4 language
or case law governs this contract.
FN21. See, e.g., Ex Parte Kampis, 826 So. 2d 819 (Ala. 2002) (owner's claim against in-state home construction company did not involve interstate commerce triggering FAA application); Marina Cove
Condo. Owners' Ass'n, 34 P.3d 86 (2001) (dispute between Washington condominium owner and instate condo owners' association regarding alleged construction defects did not involve interstate commerce for purposes of FAA).
FN22. The parties' contemplation was, until recently, potentially relevant to the question whether even
Section 2 of the FAA was applicable to any particular state-court case. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at
269.
Champ is also inapposite because it addresses only the authority of a federal district court to order class arbitration, and not the authority of an arbitrator to proceed on a class basis if he so chooses, as Judge Ervin did here.
Under the logic of Champ, a district court not only lacks power to order class arbitration, but equally lacks the
power to enjoin it, thus leaving the matter to the arbitrator. In this case, the arbitrator's own decision to proceed
on a class-wide basis moots any question here regarding whether the FAA would preempt a state trial court's order directing class arbitration.
Petitioner argues that the trial court's certification of a class in Bazzle before sending the case to arbitration
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“infected the arbitrations.” Pet. Br. 34-35. That is not the case. The arbitrator exercised his authority to proceed
with class arbitration in both the Bazzle and Lackey cases. In Lackey, the arbitrator decided the class certification
question and the trial court subsequently affirmed the decision, whereas in Bazzle, the court made an initial class
certification order before the case was referred to the arbitrator. After Bazzle was shifted to the arbitral forum,
however, and Green Tree moved to decertify the class, the arbitrator made a de novo determination that “a class
action should proceed in arbitration” based on his own “careful review of the broadly drafted arbitration clause
prepared by Green Tree.” Pet. App. 84a. He independently “found that the requirements for class certification
were met and that class certification was appropriate,” id. at 86a, and did not even cite the state trial court's class
certification decision. Further, he exercised his discretion*44 to reconfigure the Bazzle and Lackey classes so
that each class dealt with only one type of transaction, and he excluded out-of-state transactions and opt-outs
[FN23]
from the classes.
FN23. When respondents urged the trial court to affirm the arbitrator's award to the class in Lackey,
they did emphasize that the court had itself earlier approved class certification in identical circumstances in Bazzle. Petitioner contends (Pet. Br. 37) that respondents are thereby estopped from now
claiming that the arbitrator's decision in Lackey was independent of the judge's certification decision in
Bazzle. Respondents never argued, however, that the arbitrator was bound by the trial court's order. The
arbitrator's own opinion, which thoroughly considers the relevant Rule 23 factors and does not mention
Bazzle, speaks for itself. Moreover, the Bazzle court's certification of the class (like the court's approval
of the class certification in Lackey) is a strength, not a weakness, in respondents' case. Even were this
court to view the class certification question as one for the court and not the arbitrator, see generally
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), that conclusion would not affect the outcome in this case because both decision makers were in agreement on the matter.
In both cases, the Arbitrator's decision to proceed on a class-wide basis was just the kind of discretionary, procedural decision that, in the absence of contrary state-law or contractual directive, rests in an arbitrators' sole
discretion. There is no reason in either Bazzle or Lackey to conclude that the arbitrator failed to appreciate that
the decision was his to make. The fact that the arbitrator and the court agreed on the appropriateness of class
certification is wholly unsurprising, given that the case was such an obvious candidate for class treatment. In
any event, Green Tree's objection has never been that the wrong decision maker approved class arbitration here,
but rather that its Agreement foreclosed class arbitration altogether. After all, if the error were that the court
made a decision that should have been for the arbitrator, the remedy for resulting prejudice (had there been any)
would have been to vacate and remand to the arbitrator, see Garvey, 532 U.S. at 510, a remedy that petitioner
never sought here, could not *45 now seek, and in any event does not want. What petitioner urges is that no decision maker could have ordered class arbitration here.
Finally, even if it applied here, Champ's reasoning is no more persuasive than petitioner's erroneous contractlanguage argument. The court in Champ found in § 4's requirement that district courts order arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the agreement” a negative implication that, where the parties “did not include in their
agreement an express term providing for class arbitration,” the district court could not order such proceedings.
55 F.3d at 276. That logic is flawed for the same reason that petitioner's contention that its agreement, which did
not mention class arbitration, thereby prohibited it. See Point II, infra. The reference in § 4 to enforcement of the
agreement “in accordance with [its] terms,” like the similar language in this Court's § 2 cases, refers to enforcement of arbitration agreements on the same terms as other contracts, not a special rule requiring that all arbitrat[FN24]
ors' authorities be spelled out.
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FN24. Champ also considered whether the FAA's silence on class proceedings permits federal courts to
rely on Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to certify classes for arbitration. 55 F.3d at 276. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(3) expressly makes the Federal Rules applicable to FAA proceedings “to the extent that matters of procedure are not provided for” in the FAA. Champ found no authority in Rule 81(a)(3) for a
district court to certify a class for arbitration, however, because that rule “only applies to judicial proceedings under the FAA, 55 F.3d at 276, whereas class certification affects the ensuing arbitration. That
reasoning, too, rests on procedural provisions applicable only in federal court.
In sum, the FAA, which says nothing whatsoever about class actions in state proceedings, simply does not speak
to the threshold procedures through which state courts refer cases to arbitration, let alone the procedures that arbitrators in state cases should use once cases are referred to them. This Court in Southland let stand a California
Supreme Court *46 decision to permit class-wide arbitration because Southland had not raised and the state
courts had not passed on the question whether the state law was preempted by the FAA. 465 U.S. at 8-9. Petitioner here purports to assert the federal ground that was lacking in Southland. We have shown that there is no
[FN25]
such preemptive force to the FAA.
FN25. Strong concerns about whether Southland was correctly decided counsel, at a minimum, against
any expansion here of the FAA's preemptive scope. In Southland, Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist
would have held that FAA § 2 does not apply in state court. 465 U.S. at 24 (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens in Southland would have found no preemption of the state
law excluding wage claims from arbitration, 465 U.S. at 17-21 (concurring in part and dissenting in
part), and in his dissent in Perry, he characterized Southland as having “rewritten the statute to give it a
pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did not intend,” 482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See,
id. at 494-495 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). In Allied-Bruce, Justices Scalia and Thomas would have held
that the FAA does not apply in state courts, 513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 285-97
(Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting), whereas Justice O'Connor acquiesced on stare decisis
grounds in the majority's decision to uphold Southland even while she thought is was “wrong” and
“continue[d] to believe that Congress never intended the Federal Arbitration Act to apply in state
courts,” 513 U.S. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See generally Brief of Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents (setting forth arguments in favor of overruling Southland).
Because the judgment in this case is clearly correct even under Southland, we do not believe that the
Court need decide here whether to overrule that decision, but if there were any conflict between Southland and the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, Southland should yield. See Brief of Law
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents.
B. Congress Acted Reasonably in Not Blocking Class Arbitration
Seeking to erect a conflict where there is none on the face of the statute, petitioner characterizes class arbitration
as “a bizarre and dangerous hybrid,” and suggests that the FAA *47 thus should be construed to have preempted
states from allowing such procedures absent express authorization in the arbitration agreement. Pet. Br. 41. In
particular, petitioner and its amici raise the specter of due process concerns related to class arbitration. Those issues are not before this Court, where the question presented is limited to the statutory preemption issue. There is
no basis in the record for any claim of due process violation, petitioner waived any such claim, Pet. App. 25a,
and it is not at all clear, given Green Tree's bankruptcy, that petitioner would have standing to invoke the due
process rights of class members.
Unnamed class members' due process rights were carefully preserved in these cases by the arbitrator's adherence
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to the best class action procedural protocols, including careful definition of the classes and the first-class mailing
[FN26]
to each individual class member of a fully informative notice of opt-out rights.
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at
811 (describing *48 constitutionally adequate notice). Even if this Court found such concerns relevant to the
FAA preemption question presented, there is no reason to think that states and state arbitrators cannot design
workable procedures for facilitating arbitration consistent with due process requirements. Indeed, the process
followed in this case refutes such a suggestion. In any event, such matters can and should be litigated on a caseby-case basis, and speculation about due process issues does not warrant reading into the FAA a preemptive rule
that Congress did not adopt.
FN26. The arbitrator approved the notice of the class arbitration that class counsel mailed to each class
member. J.A. 17-23. The notice specified that the case was in arbitration, and was signed by the arbitrator. It stated in capital letters at the outset: “PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE CAREFULLY AND IN
ITS ENTIRETY. YOUR RIGHTS WILL BE AFFECTED BY PROCEEDINGS IN THIS LITIGATION.” J.A. 17. The notice described the claims, the contours of the class, and the status of the case. It
outlined class members' options and their consequences, including that persons opting out would “not
be entitled to share in the benefits of any settlement or judgment if it is favorable to the Class,” and
would “not be bound by the settlement or judgment if it is adverse to the class.” J.A. 19-20. Correspondingly, the notice specified that “[a]ny class member who does not request to be excluded will automatically be included in the Action as members of the Class represented by the Named Plaintiffs,” and
be “bound by the orders entered and notices hereafter given in this Action.” J.A. 20 (emphasis in original). The Notice alerted class members of their right to enter an appearance through an attorney of their
choice, and stated that if they chose not to do so they would be represented by class counsel, whose
names and addresses were listed. J.A. 21. It listed class counsel's toll-free number and directed class
members to call if they had any questions. J.A. 22.
Petitioner relatedly contends that class arbitration should be barred because it “cannot bind the nonrepresentative class members.” Pet. Br. 45. That is not the case. The unnamed class members here, each of
whom signed the same arbitration agreement as the class representatives, and each of whom elected not to opt
out of the class, are validly subject to the decision by the arbitrator. These facts distinguish this case from EEOC
v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002), on which petitioner principally relies. There, the Court correctly noted
that agreements to arbitrate cannot bind parties, such as the EEOC in that case, who never agreed to arbitrate at
all. Id. at 294. See also First Options 514 U.S. at 946. Here, however, all the unnamed class members did agree
to final and binding arbitration on the same terms as did the class representatives, and acquiesced to arbitration
before Judge Ervin. There is no reason to believe the final award here has less binding effect on the unnamed
class members than any arbitral award has on parties to an arbitration. See, e.g., Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 297
(noting that “ordinary principles of … res judicata … may apply” to prevent the EEOC from obtaining victimspecific relief for an employee who already obtained relief through arbitration); *49S.C. Code. Ann. §
15-48-150 (1976 Supp. 2001) (arbitration awards shall be “enforced as any other judgment or decree”); cf. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(c) (specifying “arbitration and award” as an affirmative defense for pleading purposes). No member
of the respondent class has sought relief in any further proceeding beyond what was obtained in this case, and
there is no basis to believe that any South Carolina court would honor any such request.
Petitioner's real concern in opposing class arbitration is not to protect unnamed class members' procedural
rights, but to benefit from their lack of knowledge about their rights and the difficulty of securing counsel in
light of the modest sums at issue. Far fewer claimants will ever sue individually in the absence of the ability to
proceed as part of a class. It is the potential radically to reduce legal exposure that appeals to petitioner and its
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amici. Class action rules at the state as well at the federal level, however, serve the entirely valid objective of
overcoming obstacles posed by lack of information or modest claim size in the interests of fuller and more effi[FN27]
cient law enforcement.
From the perspective of absent class members, class arbitration is not more
“complex, expensive and time-consuming” (Pet. Br. 40) than individual arbitration, but, on the contrary, captures efficiencies that *50 often make the difference for them between some relief and none.
FN27. This Court emphasized that very purpose in Shutts when it held that the Due Process Clause did
not require “opt-in” rather than “opt-out” class procedures under the Kansas class action rule. Recognizing that a typical class member might not “file suit individually, nor would he affirmatively request
inclusion in the class if such a request were required by the Constitution,” the Court rejected the defendant's argument that due process forecloses “opt-out” classes. 472 U.S. at 813; see Amchem Prods. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a
solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”); Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 446 U.S. 947 (1980).
Petitioner does not oppose class arbitration because it believes that there should have been 3,700 individual proceedings instead of one class arbitration. Green Tree and its amici, like other parties with potential exposure to
large groups of people, oppose class arbitration in the knowledge that, “because many claims are not viable if
brought individually, plaintiffs will often drop or fail to initiate claims once it is clear that class relief is unavailable.” Sternlight, Arbitration Meets the Class Action, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 8 (2000). Nor is petitioner insisting, as does federal securities regulation, that rights to pursue class-wide relief in court must be preserved
[FN28]
notwithstanding agreements to arbitrate.
Instead, petitioner and its amici “hope they have found a surreptitious way to defeat the feared class action,” id. at 5, by establishing a rule that standard-form arbitration
contracts that do not expressly provide for class treatment implicitly waive any right to bring class claims. To
that end, petitioner urges this Court to displace South Carolina law with a federal rule that would presumptively
disfavor arbitration of class claims. It is petitioner's proposal, not the decision below, that is hostile to arbitration. Petitioner has pointed to no evidence that Congress even sought to regulate state law on arbitral procedures, much less that it sought to bar class actions where state law permits them on a non-discriminatory basis in
litigation and arbitration.
FN28. See NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, § 10301(d)(3), (prohibiting arbitration of class claims
even where putatively covered by arbitration agreement in favor of litigation all such claims).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court should be affirmed.
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle
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